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Abstract Many Western countries have introduced market principles in health-
care. The newly introduced financial instrument of ‘‘care-intensity packages’’ in the
Dutch long-term care sector fit this development since they have some character-
istics of a market device. However, policy makers and care providers positioned
these instruments as explicitly not belonging to the general trend of marketisation in
healthcare. Using a qualitative case study approach, we study the work that the two
providers have done to fit these instruments to their organisations and how that
enables and legitimatises market development. Both providers have done various
types of work that could be classified as market development, including creating
accounting systems suitable for markets, redefining public values in the context of
markets, and starting commercial initiatives. Paradoxically, denying the existence of
markets for long-term care and thus avoiding ideological debates on the marketi-
sation of healthcare has made the use of market devices all the more likely. Making
the market invisible seems to be an operative element in making the market work.
Our findings suggest that Dutch long-term care reform points to the need to study
the ‘making’ rather than the ‘liberalising’ of markets and that the study of healthcare
markets should not be confined to those practices that explicitly label themselves as
such.
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Introduction: How to Frame ‘Marketisation’?
The academic debate on introducing ideas, principles and instruments of markets
into healthcare sectors is a road full of pitfalls. What we mean by markets in the
healthcare setting is a complicated question due to the slippery nature of the term
‘market’ [27, 19] and the broad ideological battle over the role of markets in
healthcare. In many countries, the role of markets remains an ideological dividing
line and dominant theme in health policy [38]. Some governments explicitly believe
that the healthcare sector could learn something from markets or business practice.
In the UK, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, various governments have
defended a market-oriented approach to hospital care and/or healthcare insurance to
improve the efficiency, quality and responsiveness of healthcare [15, 18, 32].
Whereas at times healthcare reform initiatives are explicitly positioned in relation to
ideological commitments about the role of markets in healthcare, interestingly,
governments sometimes introduce highly similar instruments without relating them
to the term market. By staying away from the suggestion of a market-oriented
approach, governments stay out of the ideological battle even though they are still
following a marketisation path. In response, it is sometimes suggested that public
systems are ‘‘sleepwalking into the market’’ [11: 1850]. An interesting example is
the introduction of care-intensity packages in Dutch long-term care, where the
amount of money a care provider receives for a client is related to their individual
need. These packages are not presented as market instruments and yet seem to be an
attribute of markets. This example of introducing market elements without reference
to the concept of markets makes an interesting case for reflecting on how we should
typify ‘marketisation’. How to frame this kind of policy reform that is happening in
many Western countries, especially when it is not taking place under the explicit
heading of introducing market elements?
Analysts across the spectrum of opinion state that the simplistic dichotomous
framework of market versus government is not fruitful for the analysis of healthcare
reforms in Western countries [27]. White [38: 395] argues that ‘‘to classify policy
choices as ‘market’ versus ‘government’ or ‘competitive’ versus ‘regulative’ is
likely to confuse an analysis of alternatives.’’ These common labels deflect attention
from how and why policies work and are not useful analytical terms to frame our
investigation of the developments in the healthcare sector [14, 38]. Whereas terms
like ‘regulated market’, ‘quasi-market’ or ‘managed competition’ [8, 9, 18] suppose
that institutions are better classified on a continuum between state and markets, or
that they are hybrid oxymoronic institutions that combine regulation and compe-
tition, scholars in the emerging field of social studies of markets would state that
such terms are a pleonasm: one cannot think of markets without regulation. The
introduction of market mechanisms in healthcare can be part of a more market-
oriented approach, but it need not imply that this sector should be labelled a
‘market’ for these mechanisms to work. In the healthcare setting, the label refers to
a diverse set of market-like instruments and arrangements, such as privately owned
and managed institutions, financial incentives, competition and contracting between
purchasers and providers [25]. These attributes are not the same in every market.
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Private organisations, for instance, can range from American stockholder-owned
insurance companies to non-profit sickness funds in the German tradition and not all
attributes exist in every market—see the internal market in the UK with competition
between publicly-owned hospital trusts. Following Wittgenstein’s concept of
‘family resemblance’, we could typify the group of markets as a family, where
various resemblances between different members overlap and crisscross, but it is
hard to find anything common to all [39]. Defining ‘marketisation’ as an increasing
level of resemblance or becoming a hybrid member of the ‘family’ of markets
allows us to circumvent the dichotomous framework of markets versus government.
The introduction of market instruments into public service provision may—
intentionally or unintentionally—not be presented as such a policy reform and thus
may not be easy to recognise until it has reached a late stage. Diagnosing the
character of such policy reform is especially difficult due to the lengthy process of
introducing market devices to the public sector [15, 31]. Incremental shifts can add
up to fundamental transformations [21]. Therefore, in this paper we conduct the
scholarly experiment of analysing the introduction of new devices into the Dutch
long-term care sector as preparing the ground for marketisation. Acknowledging the
step-by-step character of policy reform, we shift the unit of analysis from the policy
object to the policy process, from the introduction of market elements to the long
process of market development. We thus aim to contribute a way of studying
markets-in-the-making and show its consequences for empirical research.
Studying Processes of Marketisation
To address the question of how to study current healthcare reforms, not as the
introduction of clearly identified market elements but rather as processes of
marketisation in public service domains, we draw upon the study of technology
development in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and on the study
of market development in the field of Institutional Policy Science (IPS). The former
has developed an extensive repertoire for studying the inherent dynamics and
consequences of technology development, where it explicitly includes changes in
the technology after their introduction. The latter has produced a conceptual
machinery for analysing gradual institutional change that allows us to study the
introduction of a market device before it is presented as an institutional reform.
Both scholarly domains, commonly carried out in relative professional isolation,
recognise that the policy instrument is not a fixed entity and that policy instruments
may have unintended effects (market development can be an emergent aim rather
than a clearly recognised goal from the start).
Authors in the STS field have argued that when introducing technologies into
new settings, it can be a strength if objects are not too clearly defined and ‘black
boxed’. De Laet and Mol [7: 225] propose that the strength of some devices is not
that they are clearly fixed but that a technology is ‘‘an object that isn’t too rigorously
bounded, that does not try to impose itself but tries to serve, that is adaptable,
flexible and responsive—in short a fluid object’’. De Laet and Mol mobilise the
metaphor of fluidity of objects to explain the success of specific technologies.
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STS scholars have also analysed the introduction of market instruments or
devices from the perspective of performativity, which focuses on the construction of
markets with the aid of market devices. According to Callon and Muniesa [3],
markets cannot exist without a set of market devices. Through the notion of
‘device’, objects (the care-intensity package in our case study) can be considered as
objects with agency: ‘‘whether they might just help (in a minimalist, instrumental
version) or force (in a maximalist, deterministic version), devices do things’’ [25: 2].
Devices may therefore contribute to ‘discipline’ behaviour and to market-like
decisions. However this discipline is not mechanical, irreversible or irrevocable. ‘‘It
evolves and transforms itself since the tools, those solid points in the system, are
themselves plastic, open, reconfigurable and, moreover, constantly reconfigured’’
[1: 26]. Despite efforts to frame a market with devices, framing can never be
accomplished as any frame is incessantly subject to overflowing, or what economists
refer to as ‘externalities’ [1]. Recognising this bricolage or tinkering with devices,
framing work is never over, for new framings are always possible [2].
This finding bears resemblance to the study of gradual institutional change in IPS
[21, 31]. Institutional change is not an abrupt wholesale transformation, but more an
on-going struggle, although gradual change can add up to major historical
discontinuities. Market reform is not a big bang operation [19]. In their analysis of
the evolution of market-oriented reform of hospital care in the Netherlands,
Helderman et al. [15] conclude that the only reason this policy could lead to the
successful introduction of a recognisable market policy was a process of policy
learning that took over two decades. Referring to policy learning, they mean the
‘‘process by which policy makers and stakeholders deliberately adjust the goals,
rules, and techniques of a given policy in response to past experiences and new
information’’ (ibid.: 189). The development of the Dutch market for hospital care
shows how a series of incremental (path-dependent) changes could lead to (path-
breaking) non-incremental change in policy [15, 19]. Over the decades, many
technical and institutional adjustments were made, and are still being made, to
prepare hospitals and insurance companies for a market-based policy reform, which
culminated in the Health Insurance act (ZVW) in 2006. According to Helderman
et al., this incremental approach was inspired by a long-term market development
strategy (introducing competition) that was repeatedly adjusted to the political and
institutional setting, meanwhile continuing to shape this setting to prepare it for a
market-based policy reform. ‘‘Many of these necessary adjustments could not have
been foreseen, but had to be discovered and learned by policy makers and
stakeholders by trial and error’’ [15: 204]. Similarly, Marmor et al. [22] warn
politicians against an over eagerness to embrace and import policy models without
properly assessing how these ideas and models work in other practices and how they
may require adjustment rather than implementation. Maarse and Paulus [20]
therefore state that Dutch market reform is far from finished and, since 2006, there
has been a constant need for adjustment and political compromise.
Both studies, technology development in STS and gradual institutional change in
IPS, point to the importance of including dynamism and process analysis when
studying innovation or reform. While the scholarly domains conceptualise the
process differently, both notions of fluidity and gradual institutional change provide
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a method of studying marketisation that matches the shift in IPS from government to
governance [23], and where policy is not limited to what formal policy institutions
do but is the outcome of the actions of a plethora of actors, including market
devices.
However, empirical studies of gradual institutional change usually make
retrospective claims, once the reform has succeeded (or not). This is unfortunate,
since it presents the study of policy reform with the post hoc problem. In this paper
we explore the value of a processual approach that is not ex-post, but studies policy
reform before it can surely be identified as such. Sieber [30: 204] describes this
challenging task as ‘‘the effort to anticipate the hitherto unanticipated, and perhaps
none is so foolhardy.’’ Sieber followed the Mertonian approach that interventions
can produce the opposite of the effect desired by their architects, and that we need,
or should at least try to confront the surprising or unexpected at an earlier stage [16].
Our idea that the new financial device may render the sector susceptible to future
marketisation, even if it is not presented as a marketisation device, rests on the
argument that there may be some Mertonian logic going on here.
Making Markets Instead of Liberalising Markets
We analyse the introduction of a new financial regime that may prove to be the early
stages of a market-based policy change in the provision of long-term care in the
Netherlands. We follow the introduction of a new ‘market-like’ device for financing
long-term care: the ‘care-intensity package’, an individual-trailing budget for long-
term care clients. This is interesting because this is a concrete financial instrument
that bares a resemblance to a market device even if it is not presented as a kind of
market mechanism. Rather, it is presented as an instrument to implement the policy
aim of strengthening client-oriented care. Despite this label, we explore the value of
analysing the introduction of these devices as part of a long-term process of making
markets in long-term care.
Although the central government forces providers to adopt the new financial
regime, providers still have and need some latitude in how to translate the new
device to their local setting. Therefore we focus on the reception part of the
introduction of the policy instrument [4], that is, how external devices are integrated
into local policies and adapted to a particular context [26]. ‘‘The transferred
elements are transformed to blend with the new context’’ [4: 454] while these
elements also shape the receivers themselves. The meaning and impact of
introducing care-intensity packages should first be studied at the coalface, where
people have to deal with the device and where its meaning is largely defined. The
next questions are, what influence, if any, do these practical experiences have on the
policy discourse on long-term care and do they help move this sector towards a
more market-driven logic.
Streeck and Thelen [31: 33] suggest that liberalisation in capitalism (a general
opening-up of social and economic arrangements to the logic of ‘free’ competitive
markets) ‘‘may be achievable by default: by letting things happen that are happening
anyway. All that may be needed for liberalisation to progress in this case would be
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to give people a market alternative to an existing system based on collective
solidarity, and then give free rein to the private insurance companies and their sales
forces.’’ This view shows that Adam Smith’s famous metaphor of the ‘invisible
hand’ is still informing the debate about markets. Foucault [10] criticises this
laissez-faire view of the market economy as ‘naive naturalism’ that interprets
market exchange or competition as something produced spontaneously. Our
approach follows Foucault’s suggestion that market behaviour is not the outcome of
a policy of laissez-faire. This perspective on the institutional transformation of
public into market sectors conceptualises the healthcare sector as an example of
making markets rather than liberalising public sectors. This approach allow us to
analyse how the new market device of the care-intensity package and the work done
by providers to transform these devices to their practice serves the creation of
markets for long-term care.
Methods
To analyse markets-in-the-making, we addressed two questions. First, what is the
intended result of introducing care-intensity packages in the Dutch long-term care
sector? We analysed the supposed characteristics of the device and the extent of its
appearance as a financial market device. Second, what visible and invisible work
must the providers do to adapt and transform care packages for their organisation?
We focused on unintended consequences, especially if this work can be diagnosed
as making markets or preparing the way for the eventual marketisation of the sector.
Studying the unintended results, the work needed to make markets work, cannot
be done overnight. The development, introduction and shaping of healthcare
markets takes place over extended periods marked by ubiquitous reconfigurations of
organisations, market mechanisms, professionals and policy makers. Therefore, we
focused our empirical analysis on two long-term care institutions, an organisation
for mentally disabled people and a nursing home that we have studied since 2005.
Our analysis draws upon qualitative data collected from 2005 to 2010 in semi-
structured, in-depth interviews (n = 22) and focus groups (n = 2).
In 2005, we focused on new developments such as market-like financing,
commercial initiatives and demand-oriented care (see [12]). At the time we collected
data through semi-structured, in-depth interviews (n = 13) and focus groups (n = 2)
with executives, managers, professionals and client representatives. Contrary to our
initial expectations, the interviews gave the impression that the effects of the
developing healthcare market are found primarily on the shop floor. In the previous
study, the organisations were on the eve of introducing care packages and, some of
them, commercial activities as well. We returned to these organisations to see if their
first ideas on how to deal with care-intensity packages had become reality. The
organisations had tried to respond proactively to the introduction of care-intensity
packages. Their stance on these new financial instruments—critical yet not complete
rejection—allows us to analyse how organisations adapt new policy instruments into
their practice. In the organisation for disabled people, we focused on how they dealt
with the new policy device of care-intensity packages. Here we interviewed (n = 6)
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the project manager for care packages (ZZP), one cluster manager, two location
managers, one senior finance adviser and one marketing manager. In the elderly care
organisation with serious ambitions to start commercial activities, we wanted to
know if they had developed the commercial activities and how they related to the
care-intensity packages. Here, we interviewed (n = 3) the executive, the medical
manager and one care adviser. In both organisations, we interviewed people in
different organisation levels, including the shop floor, to realise data triangulation.
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed to explore the conse-
quences of market mechanisms introduced some years ago and to see how these
market devices had developed since then. This combination of data sources over a
longer period of time allowed us to address the issues raised above. As is generally
the case in qualitative research, representativeness is not the aim of the study [5].
Rather, this research focuses on a in-depth analysis of a specific case to produce
precise findings that may function like a ‘golden event’ [17] in the sense that they
can produce, through their specificity, interesting insights into practices that would
not be captured by more general analyses of larger numbers of cases [37].
We analysed and ordered the data with the aid of themes to discover and clarify
possible consequences of introducing care packages. The themes included
administration and management activities, attention for business processes, how
care packages are discussed with clients, private initiatives in the care organisation,
and distribution issues. Both authors discussed selected data until consensus was
reached on data interpretation. Both research reports were sent to the involved
organisations for member checks.
The board and respondents from the care organisations gave permission for the
interviews. Within Dutch jurisdiction, there was no need for ethical approval for the
empirical research. To respect the privacy of the participants in this study, all data
have been made anonymous.
Explicit Policy Aims of Introducing Care-Intensity Packages
The General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) is a population-wide
social insurance scheme for long-term care that cannot be covered with insurance.
Since 1968, it has provided security for people who are disabled, chronically ill or
suffer from a mental disorder. The AWBZ regulation aimed to provide funding for
long-term care, shifting the financial burden from families and charity to public
funding. It kept the legally independent status of private institutions in place, except
that providers of residential care were not allowed to have a profit motive. They
benefited from the new funding stream, greatly expanding their capacity in the
1970s and 1980s. In comparison to other European countries, the Netherlands has a
high rate of residential or institutionalised care [24].
Residential care is paid mainly from the AWBZ. Residents face fairly high co-
payments, especially for the cost of living. However, they often do not pay the full
charge, since their contribution depends on indication, household composition,
income and, since 2014, property. Only a small minority of people who need
residential care make use of commercial services outside the AWBZ. For persons to
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qualify for care under the AWBZ, they apply for a needs assessment decided by an
independent organisation responsible for determining care needs [29]. This
assessment, translated nowadays into a care-intensity package, aims at guaranteeing
both that individual needs are met, and that the value of accessibility is ensured.
Insurers, or the healthcare offices they designate, enter into contracts with
institutionalised providers. On the basis of their care-intensity package, individual
users could choose their own providers from the list of contracted care institutions.
This regulatory arrangement is based on the principle that money should follow
the patient or client. It could be seen as an explicit attempt to create a market for
long-term care, but is not presented as such, with the argument that there is no real
choice due to the overall shortage of capacity, with substantial waiting times at
many care institutions. De facto this means that provider choice is highly
determined by availability. Furthermore, the fact that the largest insurance company
in a region gets a 4-year government concession to carry out the purchasing role for
all local insurance companies adds to the fact that long-term care is not seen as a
market.
Since 1999, the Dutch Ministry of Health (MoH) has been trying to develop a
system of entitlements and payments for long-term care that is not based on the
average client receiving care from a care provider, but is attuned to the individual
needs of each client [33, 34]. This attempt to provide more client-centred care
implies that ‘products’ delivered by providers are given a ‘price tag’. It was
generally understood that the old supply-oriented long-term care system was no
longer equipped to serve today’s public. The proceedings of the meeting of the
House of Representatives of the Netherlands state:
The public is emancipated and has made clear that it wants to find meaning in
life for itself and be responsible for doing so. Anticipating this societal
development is the biggest problem when it comes to modernising the AWBZ.
It requires redesigning the system so that it complies with the public’s
demands for more freedom of choice, more options, more of a say and more
participation [34: 1].
Intending to enhance both customer choice and voice, the MoH wanted to develop
new financial rules for the AWBZ. According to the ministry, flexible entitlements
and thus individual-linked payments are needed to achieve tailor-made care.
Entitlements should be described in specific terms so that clients can determine
whether they are getting ‘value for money’ [33: 24].
In 2007, after long preparation, the MoH introduced the care-intensity packages
[35]. Individual ‘indications’ (assessments) and budgets were designed to provide
patients with greater choice and control over their support arrangements. The new
financial framework was based on the idea of personal budgets or cash-for-care
schemes,1 however, they are not the same. With the personal budget, patients can
buy and organise their own care, including from non-professionals, for instance
neighbours, friends and family, whereas the care-intensity packages are still
1 See Da Roit and Le Bihan [6] for an overview of these schemes in six European countries.
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provided in a framework of provision in kind. Introducing individual-trailing or
‘client-linked’ budgets has had consequences for providers whose payment is now
output-based and who are thus actively encouraged to attract and keep clients, since
clients have more exit options. The idea is that if clients are better informed about
their rights or their budget (because they have a stronger position vis-a`-vis their
provider), they will have a better chance of satisfying their own needs and wishes.
For instance, clients can choose between a 30 min bath and two 15 min showers,
according to the official user guide [28]. Care packages were introduced in the
AWBZ on 1 January 2009.
In the new scheme, the assessment is tailored to the individual client and used as
a basis for the care package. For 2010, 52 care-intensity packages were defined for
the three sectors of intramural care: ten for nursing homes, 13 for people with
psychiatric problems and 29 for people with a mental disability. Entitlements are
broadly defined. A care package, including a global indication of hours per week,
describes which functions it delivers, such as support (SP), personal care (PC),
nursing (NU), daytime activities and treatment. A draft version of the care package
method defined entitlements more strictly, specifying the exact hours per function.
Importantly, the new system permits substitution of activities. In the example shown
in Fig. 1, the client can substitute support for personal care.
With client-linked or individual-trailing funding, the budget follows the client. In
spite of the limited choice options for clients due to provider waiting times, the
MoH propagates the idea that the output finance system will drive providers to
improve the quality of care and become more client-oriented:
I expect individual-trailing funding for care in kind to act as an incentive for
care providers to provide effective, good quality care in the form of an
arrangement that meets clients’ preferences, since the funding is not based on
the institution but on clients with particular care needs [36: 12].
Even given the providers’ lack of capacity, and if competing for clients was not a
realistic option, the financial incentive could stem from clients’ awareness of their
entitlements and subsequent claims to get what their indications said they were due.
However, in publications on this topic, the ministry states that care packages should
not lead to a fully individualised care model that allows each and every client to
demand their ‘rights’. This is not in the spirit of the public AWBZ, which often
offers care on a collective or group basis [36]. Thus, even though care packages
Functions and time per client per week
Residential care Day activities Treatment Total time
Function SP PC NU If day activities:
Average time daily:
9 hours
Average group size: 7
Treatment is included in this care 
package.
Average treatment time:
1.2 hours
Excluding day activities:
11.5 to 14.0 hours
Including day activities:
16.0 to 19.5 hours
yes yes no
Average: 11.5 hours
Fig. 1 Example of a care-intensity package (category 3) for the mentally challenged
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were developed partly to empower the user of care, the ministry does not want the
packages to lead to calculating, claim-happy care consumers. However, care-
intensity packages have some characteristics of a market device, such as different
prices for different clients, an output finance system, more incentives for providers
and more customer choice and voice. The basic idea is that tailor-made finance
should lead to tailor-made care more easily than the old funding system did.
What Happens in Practice?
Despite the new care-intensity packages, according to many of our respondents,
especially the residential part of the long-term care sector is, as mentioned above,
not a real market since there is hardly any competition, insufficient choice, more
demand than supply (waiting lists), and providers often have no latitude to negotiate
on prices. A main reason for the scarcity of care, or waiting lists, is that the MoH
maintained production quota for the AWBZ regions to protect the overall macro
budget for healthcare. But even though the provider has little room to negotiate on
price and volume with the insurer that has regional purchasing responsibilities, the
introduction of ‘price tags’ (the budget of a care package) leads to changes in the
internal organisation of the provider and in the provider-client relationship.
Organising Care with the Aid of Care Packages
Individual care funding was driven by the idea that clients are good at determining
whether they get value for money. As a middle manager of an organisation for the
mentally disabled said: ‘‘There is more pressure on accountability, so we have to
look at how we can make things clearer’’. With ‘things’ he referred to the care and
services clients were receiving. However, providers also said that they need a
workable form of accountability. Complete transparency of individual care package
spending requires extensive registration of total hours or activities. Collective
accountability at location level is easier for providers, especially in situations where
clients live in groups and receive collective care. Moreover, the accountability to
care offices and clients is easier for groups with the same type of clients and care-
intensity packages. To create a workable situation, the provider does not strive for
complete transparency of care package spending per client, except for some
information on duration, including collective or group hours. This transformation of
individual care packages into collective arrangements also creates, according to one
manager, some latitude for caregivers to trade clients’ individual fluctuations in
daily needs (cluster manager, organisation for disabled people).
Respondents indicate that the individual funding system has increased insight
into business processes and providers are better equipped to benchmark locations
internally and instigate improvements. They can compare locations in terms of
economic performance and whether locations are faced with over- or underpro-
duction issues.
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If you saw underproduction and overspending in one location, well then you’d
have to deal with a reinforcing effect. Then you’d call that location to account
one day, depending on the degree of underproduction and overspending
(senior financial adviser, organisation for disabled people).
Using the care-intensity package tool, managers can see how their location performs
compared to other locations in the same cluster. The improved transparency of the
results at location level is driving providers to adjust supply better to the indication.
Responsibility for budgetary control has shifted partly from the organisational level
down to lower levels. To balance their books, organisations used to shuffle funds
between their various budgets (substitution). Given the fact that one tariff was used
for all clients, departments that had not spent their entire budget could compensate
for departments that overspent their allocations. Nowadays, this form of substitution
has become less acceptable than it was in the past (location manager, organisation
for disabled people).
Another consequence of the new financial structure is the clustering of similar
types of clients. For instance, in the past, different degrees of disability were placed
in one group. In the present system, providers want to stop combining ‘lighter’ and
‘heavier’ clients, as the professional level of caregivers has to be attuned to the more
severe client type (middle manager, organisation for the disabled). The increased
transparency generated by the new financial structure stimulates the provider to
cluster the same type of clients to save on overhead and staffing costs. The provider
no longer wants to rule out the possibility of moving clients to another location
because of related efficiency gains.
Not all these consequences are directly caused by the individual funding system.
According to one respondent, lower budgets for care packages force the
organisation to develop efficient ways of providing care or take more notice of
the business process (senior financial adviser, organisation for disabled people). In
any event, care packages help providers to make clear which of their locations are
inefficient or not remunerative enough and where they need to change their
organisation of care. Providers are answering questions on location performance
increasingly by using an internal market perspective of profitability of locations.
Although budget reductions partly induce this, the financial instruments are
instrumental in this development.
Care-Intensity Packages as a Tool to Substantiate the Possible
Since providers are not searching for standardisation in terms of concrete activities,
hours or Euros, care-intensity packages are used only to describe in general what the
client can and cannot expect from the provider. Respondents mention that care-
intensity packages have the advantage of making clearer what a provider will or will
not deliver. They can use the care-intensity package as a tool to start talking with
clients or to check if they have really put their money where their mouth is (actually
achieve what they advocate). As in a regular market, the provider can now delineate
the possible and substantiate what is not possible:
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The old system just could not do that. Then it was just indications for
residence and care. Okay, so now you get emancipated clients who think that
every normal request is possible. And now you can make clear that a lot is
possible, yes, but within limits. You can only opt for something at a given
moment. (…) It’s like, look, if I buy a new car that means I can’t also buy,
let’s say, a new bike or audio equipment. I mean, I can only spend my euro
once. You see? In that sense you can make things transparent (financial
adviser, organisation for the disabled).
However, according to our respondents, client representatives almost never use the
care package as an aid to talking about the amount or quality of care. They are more
interested in how things are going and if the care is all right for them. Respondents
experienced that clients seldom use the care package as an instrument for demand-
driven care.
Interestingly, individual funding tends to strengthen the supplier’s position. As
we have shown, care-intensity packages clarify which services should or should not
be delivered. In other words, with the aid of these financial instruments, care can be
better attuned to the providers’ possible options. It becomes easier to determine
unreasonable demands and when to say ‘‘No’’ to clients. Under the guise of demand-
orientation, clients are required to fit their demands to the care package they receive.
Providers and clients have thus transformed a demand-oriented instrument into a
supply-oriented instrument. If providers gain more power than clients then the
policy would be counterproductive in terms of inducing client-oriented care.
However, this specific use of the new financial device fits with other forms of
market behaviour, where providers are accustomed to limiting their efforts to the
price consumers are prepared or able to pay.
Clarifying the Limits of Publicly Financed Care and Commercial Initiatives
Since long-term care is publicly financed by the AWBZ, many clients or their
families expect the provider to deliver everything. That is not always the case. For
instance, both providers explain that they simply lack the personnel to cope with
residential clients who want assistance for going outside as soon as the weather is
nice. Private finance creates an important option to offer more than what is possible
under a budget funded by the AWBZ. However, the Dutch publicly financed system
of long-term care has no tradition of paying for services, except for income-related
contributions to residential care. A few years ago, the organisation for elderly care
we studied wanted to develop ‘plus’ packages with extras that clients could buy
[13]. The executive of that organisation said in 2007 that he wanted to develop
products that could make life more pleasant for his residents:
If people say, ‘‘We want our mum or dad to have an hour’s walk outside every
day’’ then we’d have to say sorry, that’s not in the standard care package, but
we can do something about it. We’ll arrange it for you, but it means having to
send you a plus package bill (executive, organisation for elderly care).
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Commercial activities are seen as an attractive improvement to the healthcare
system, especially because they are presented as extra options on top of the existing
care-intensity packages. A few years later, in contrast to this provider’s ambitions,
the supply of plus packages or commercial activities is developing very slowly.
According to our respondents, there is only a limited range of products and services,
such as foods and beverages, laundry service, bedside TVs and party site rentals for
birthdays. Offering paid extras in the publicly funded part of the market is a
complicated matter, as staff members indicate that they find it hard being allowed to
offer some clients a specific service and then having to say no to other clients who
cannot afford it. This does not mean that residents do not accept differences: clearly,
it is common practice that some call a taxi and if family can make a difference, staff
will certainly react well. Problems arise if employees have to make distinctions in,
for instance, who gets the opportunity to go outside: ‘‘It feels different when one of
the staff is paid to come in and do that [accompany a fragile elderly client outside].
It’s different from someone calling a taxi to go out’’ (client adviser, organisation for
elderly care). Interestingly though, individual funding can be used to make the
distinctions clearer between basic care and the extras that people have to pay for.
You need to make the difference clear between what you need and what else
you’d like, and what to do if that little bit extra goes beyond the basic package.
Now we have a good reason to explain all this. Now you can make it clear
with the help of those care-intensity packages. It gives people a choice (client
adviser, organisation for elderly care).
Care-intensity packages can be used to clarify the limits of publicly funded
institutional care. The new financial system makes it more transparent what should
be part of the publicly financed compartment and hence what can be offered by plus
packages or has to be provided by family members and volunteers. Although this
device was developed for the publicly funded part of long-term care, providers are
trying to use it to stimulate and initiate private market initiatives and are finding out
this distinction is extremely hard to maintain in practice. They are also experiencing
that it is easier to use these devices to delineate the basic package rather than to
offer additional services.
Redefining Distributive Justice
With the introduction of care-intensity packages in long-term care, distributive
justice could gain a new meaning. In the internal allocation of resources, the
operating distributive principle of both providers gets reconfigured. People receive
an indication based on need. However, when people with an indication (care
package) go to the provider, the care package is transformed partly from a ‘need’
into an ‘economic demand’. Traditionally, because of similar funding budgets and
different needs, providers employed financial substitution between departments,
where departments with spare money (unspent budget) compensated for depart-
ments that had overspent theirs. Nowadays, every demand based on indication or
care package is taken equally seriously, which means that shuffling budgets
becomes increasingly inappropriate. At the start of the new financial scheme, one of
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the providers was concerned that substitution would no longer be possible in future
[12]. If the right to care has become defined by client budgets based on care
packages, any shifting of funds between budgets could increasingly be interpreted as
in conflict with the rights of individuals and thus unwittingly gain the connotation of
trickery, or even fraud, he feared:
You know, we used to shunt budget money around our departments and
between patients. Nowadays you couldn’t get away with that. If I did try it, I
wouldn’t be able to explain my expenditures to the accountant or to clients. I’d
run into accounting problems (division manager, organisation for the mentally
disabled).
A few years later, this idea had not entirely come true. Nowadays, this provider has
chosen to keep intact some form of substitution at the level of the organisation.
There still is room for substitution between locations in specific situations, although
this mechanism will be used less frequently than in the past and there are providers
that have completely rejected this option. In the location, care can still be distributed
according to the principle of need. One respondent explained that their organisation
is prepared to defend the fact that something must be deducted from the care-
intensity package in order to give specific groups the care they need. He considers
this a part of their societal responsibility: ‘‘We find it important that we can give
extra care when someone needs extra help. (…) You can explain that story’’
(executive, organisation for the mentally disabled). Providers have some latitude in
how they translate the individual care-intensity package into their collective care
practice. Although this could be understood as showing the acting space of
providers to accommodate individual funding schemes in collective care arrange-
ments, providers are in fact contributing to the legitimacy of introducing market
mechanisms that risk focussing on individual demand in collective healthcare
settings. Now they may have to defend practices explicitly to clients and
accountants that they could do invisibly before.
Discussion: Studying Preliminary Market-Making Work
Recognising the slippery nature of the term ‘market’ enables us to take a broader
approach to marketisation that is informed by theoretically studies on fluid
technology development and gradual institutional change. This redirects the
scholarly focus from ideological quarrels about healthcare markets to the study of
processes of market-making. In our case, even if long-term care in the Netherlands
is persistently articulated as a non-market setting, the introduction of the care-
intensity packages and the way they are reconfigured in practice is leading to
changes that could bring a market for such care a step closer or increase its
resemblance to others in the ‘family’ of markets.
We have presented the Dutch long-term care sector as an example of a market
development that does not have such an explicit policy goal. Paradoxically, denying
the existence of markets for long-term care has made the use of market devices
more likely. Presenting the new instruments as reinforcements to client-oriented
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care leaves room for providers to search for workable local solutions, such as
defining the boundaries of the care-intensity package that will be crucial for the
potential next steps in developing the market for long-term care. The providers have
entered the process of marketisation based on the introduced market devices,
although (for now) they reject the idea that the long-term care sector resembles a
market in any substantial sense. Providers have done all kinds of preliminary
market-making work, such as creating suitable individualised accounting systems,
clarifying the limits of publicly financed care, redefining (public) values in the
context of markets and starting commercial initiatives. They have done much of the
work that can be classified as market development.
Our case study suggests that market development is made possible by changing
rather than rigidly implementing the market device in local settings. Similarly, in
opposition to the suggestion that long-term care is not suitable for market
development, we find that providers can deal with the market device of care-
intensity packages, as long as they try to mould the introduced market device in
such a way that it leads to workable and justifiable solutions, which in turn also
shape both the care providers and the clients, as well as (the limits to) their
entitlements. Their work is crucial for the suitability and legitimacy of market
development. Output finance requires providers to justify and make clear how they
spend client-linked budgets; however complete accountability and transparency is
not workable. Providers have to decide how to spend these budgets and how to
apply individually client-linked budgets to group-based services. They have to
decide to what extent substitution between budgets is acceptable. Justifying this
substitution to clients is also done by using entitlement boundaries to make clients
accept the limits of care service delivery. This shows that providers have tried to
transform market devices so that they can be embedded in the Dutch tradition of
collectively organised long-term care, thus creating more legitimacy for a market-
making policy process that makes a market not at odds with collective concerns. At
the same time, the idea of collective care arrangements is not unaffected by the
market devices because of clearer limits of individual entitlements in the collective
arrangements. The government’s introduction of markets devices in combination
with the providers’ work of fitting these into the traditional provision of collective
care shows that our case is more an example of ‘making markets’ than a case of
liberalising long-term care to let ‘the market’ work. Although the policy actors
involved do not embrace market discourse, when analysing this case in terms of the
genealogy of policy reform, our study shows that these devices are rendering the
Dutch long-term care sector susceptible to further market development and
collective provision is likely to stay part of these future markets.
Following this analysis, it is no surprise that subsequent Dutch governments want
to continue the process of market development. One proposed measure is to separate
housing and care, which would reduce public expense while allowing it to be
presented again as offering more options outside the publicly financed basic
package—with professionals having to somehow make such options legitimate in
collective arrangements. Other measures are a complete cutback of funding based on
the institution to strengthen output finance and shifting the purchasing task to
individual insurers, which should stimulate insurers to focus more on their clients.
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These proposals are not new, but the introduction of care-intensity packages has
created a market framing and an accounting infrastructure which puts them back onto
the policy agenda and renders them increasingly easy to imagine. With the help of
our market-making approach, we can conclude that care-intensity packages have
prepared the sector for these new proposals, although this was not their aim. Since
2015, carrying out the AWBZ is no longer a task for the central government: it has
been delegated to three actors: light forms of care and mental healthcare are
delegated to private insurers, 24–7, heavy care is carried out by the largest regional
insurer with a purchasing concession, and youth care has been transferred to the
municipalities. This transfer of AWBZ entitlements to the domain of the already
market-oriented Health Insurance act implies further steps towards market devel-
opment that would have been hard to imagine without earlier market-making work.
At the same time, it would have been equally hard to imagine how these market
instruments for individualising entitlements could become part of a collective
understanding of long-term care provision, albeit a collective that is increasingly
safeguarded by applying clearer limits on entitlements to say ‘no’ to clients. Our
analysis shows that it is not clear if clients are more satisfied now, following the
introduction of care-intensity packages. We recommend more research into the
experience of care users in the introduction of marketisation policies, especially
when these reforms are justified with reference to client demands.
Inspired by studies of technology innovation and market development, we
propose a policy reform approach that stresses the greater importance of fluidity
above a rigidly clear definition of policy. Market development is not just a technique
of fitting a market device into a different jurisdiction or environment, but a dynamic
process of reciprocal adaptation. This surely points to the need to study the ‘making’
rather than the ‘liberalising’ of markets. And this ‘making’ can start well before
labelling initiatives in terms of markets. Therefore, the study of markets in
healthcare should by no means be confined to those practices that explicitly label
themselves as such.
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